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1 It is tempting, on some levels, to regard Scottish generalship as fundamental to a great military success story. From 1296 strenuous effforts were made by English kings to conquer Scotland. But the Scots triumphantly maintained their independence against their far more powerful neighbour. Nor were the Scots content to cower on the defensive in the long wars with England. Cross-border raiding was from the beginning a key component of the Scottish war efffort, undertaken to such efffect that at times the Scots were able to exercise a striking military ascendancy in northern Britain. For much of the later Middle Ages it was the Scots who were the aggressors in war against England, a clear demonstration of military self-confĳidence at odds with the relative resources available to the two realms. Scotland's military performance, it would seem, was exceptional. But such a sweeping verdict can easily be contradicted by looking at the same circumstances with a diffferent emphasis. The Scots were repeatedly defeated in major battlefĳield encounters, their leaders, including reigning monarchs, captured or killed in the fĳield. Only the help of foreign allies and the fact that the English state's core priorities lay fĳirmly elsewhere saved the Scots from lasting conquest. Even so, large tracts of the Scottish realm were taken into English hands and held for long periods, some parts, including Scotland's largest antebellum town, Berwick, permanently. Meanwhile, it might be argued that Scotland's wars of aggression from the 1330s achieved nothing. In these divergent views there is scope for very varied judgements of the competence of Scottish military commanders. The present paper seeks to investigate this issue with a view to reaching conclusions about the potentialities and limitations afffecting Scottish military endeavour in the period.
The most enticingly obvious way to examine the issue of leadership is to focus on the personal. On a surface view this might very well explain some of the contrasting fortunes experienced by the Scots at war. The most radical shift in this regard was the very rapid transition from highly efffective military activity conducted during the reign of Robert I to the military disasters that occurred in 1332-1333, after his death. By that time not just Robert I but his most able subordinates, Sir James Douglas and Thomas Randolph, earl of Moray, were dead. The new military leadership of the Scots appears, by contrast to the recent past, to have been suddenly incompetent.
2 Similarly, the Scots enjoyed a period of sustained military success in the 1370s and 1380s, but sufffered a number of reverses in renewed conflict from 1399 culminating in large-scale defeat at the battle of Humbleton Hill in 1402. It is tempting to link this pattern to the defection to English allegiance in 1400 of Scotland's greatest soldier of the time, George Dunbar, earl of March.
3 Issues of generalship must surely be a factor to consider, moreover, in contemplating James IV's defeat at Flodden in 1513, especially since the Spanish diplomat Pedro Ayala observed his shortcomings in this regard years earlier.
